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DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v.
SUPERIOR COURT: HEAR NO EVIL
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 9, 1991, professional ethical and moral considera-
tions prompted heated litigation in Department of Corrections v. Su-
perior Court.' Justice Donald G. Alexander of Maine's Superior
Court displayed considerable foresight while sentencing two border-
line mentally retarded child sex offenders.' Although both defend-
ants had committed repugnant crimes, Justice Alexander anticipated
that they would be subjected to impermissible abuse if incarcerated
in the Department of Corrections. He believed that preventive
measures were necessary to ensure the safety of the defendants be-
ing sentenced and to avoid the potential that conditions of their in-
carceration would amount to cruel and unusual punishment.3
Justice Alexander subsequently imposed special conditions upon the
Department of Corrections.'
The Department of Corrections sought an injunction through a
writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Department argued that the
Superior Court had exceeded its statutory authority by imposing
these special conditions. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court
granted extraordinary relief.5 Chief Justice Wathen relied on statu-
tory language stating that the Commissioner of the Department of
Corrections has "complete discretion" and is responsible for the su-
pervision, management, and control of offenders in the Depart-
ment.6 On appeal, the Superior Court contended that it had the
duty and authority to uphold the Constitutions of the United States
and Maine and that the Department was limited by those considera-
1. 622 A.2d 1131 (Me. 1993).
2. The defendants were Fawn Buzzell and Arthur Ellis; see infra note 82.
3. Department of Corrections v. Superior Court, 622 A.2d at 1133.
4. Id. at 1132.
5. Id. at 1134. Chief Justice Wathen, acting for the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, granted extraordinary relief. Although rule 81(c) of the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure abolishes extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition, it provides
that relief in that nature can be obtained through proceedings under rule 80B. See
RICHARD H. Fmu ET AL., MAINE CIVIL PRATICE §§ 80B.1, 81.9, 81.10, at 312 &
n.18, 337-39 (2nd ed. 1970); see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 7 (West 1989)
(providing that the Supreme Judicial Court "may issue all writs and processes, not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Court, necessary for the furtherance
of justice or the execution of the laws in the name of the State"); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 5301 (West 1980) (providing that "[t]he Supreme Judicial Court and
the Superior Court shall have and exercise concurrent original jurisdiction in pro-
ceedings in ... prohibition... [and] mandamus").
6. Department of Corrections v. Superior Court, 622 A.2d at 1134.
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tions.7 The Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, held
unanimously that a superior court has supervisory power over the
Department of Corrections only when the appropriate vehicle is in-
voked.8 The Law Court concluded that since no such vehicle had
been invoked, the special conditions must be deleted.
The case raised the question of what could be done with defend-
ants who suffer from either physical or mental disabilities. Could
they be protected or would they remain powerless until actual viola-
tions of rights occur? This Note will analyze the decision in Depart-
ment of Corrections v. Superior Court and the viability of existing
options at the appellate and trial court levels that enable courts to
address conditions of confinement. First, this Note will examine re-
cent Maine sentencing law and national trends that have influenced
it. Second, it will discuss the options provided by the Law Court in
Department of Corrections. Third, it will analyze a recent case to
help explain further Maine's treatment of conditions of confine-
ment. Fourth, this Note will review the stance the Law Court has
taken towards challenges of the sentencing court's determination of
sentence. Fifth, the discussion will suggest where within the sen-
tencing process the trial court may address conditions of confine-
ment without violating the Law Court's sentencing principles. Last,
the Author suggests specific changes to improve Maine's sentencing
law.
11. BACKGROUND
A. Recent Trends in Sentencing Law
1. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
In the last decade there have been enormous changes in sentenc-
ing law. For years critics argued that unwarranted sentencing dis-
parities stemmed from the unfettered discretion given to a
sentencing judge.9 In 1984, Congress responded to such criticism by
enacting the Sentencing Reform Act.' 0 This Act, which established
the United States Sentencing Commission, sought to develop statu-
tory sentencing guidelines, the goal of which was to "avoid[ ] unwar-
7. ld. at 1135. The Law Court stated that this argument was asserted by the
MCLU, which had been granted amicus curiae status. It It should be noted, how-
ever, that the sentencing court made these assertions when it denied the Depart-
ment's motion to delete the conditions. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying
text.
8. Department of Corrections v. Superior Court, 622 A.2d at 1135 (citations
omitted).
9. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legisla-
tive History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 \VWvi FoREsT L REv. 223,227-
28 (1993).
10. The Sentencing Reform Act is part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976, 1987-2040 (1984).
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ranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct ....
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which became law in 1987,12
tend to be mechanical in application. The sentencing judge need
only address two things, the characteristics of the offense and the
characteristics of the offender. After assigning values established by
the Sentencing Commission to each criterion, the sentence range is
located on a grid.' 3
Much debate exists on whether sentencing guidelines have actu-
ally reduced sentencing disparity.' 4 Critics assert that the Guide-
lines fail to account for a variety of differentiating factors including
age,' 5 educational and vocational skills, 16 mental and emotional
conditions,' 7 physical condition or appearance.' 8 drug and alcohol
dependence,' 9 employment record,20 and public service.2' The net
result, critics claim, is the imposition of draconian sentences.' Suc-
cessful or not, this enormous change in the federal sentencing sys-
tem has spurred many states to reevaluate and change their existing
sentencing law.'
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
12. It §§ 991-998.
13. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELNES MANUAL (1994).
For a more detailed discussion, see Amy K. Tchao, One Step Forward, One Step
Back. Emergency Reform and Appellate Sentence Review in Maine, 44 ME. L. Rav.
345, 354-56 (1992).
14. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Dis-
parity, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 142 (1991).
15. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1 (Nov. 1992).
16. Id. § 5H1.2.
17. ltt § 5H1.3.
18. Itt § 5H1.4. See also United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 1995)
(defendants with HIV/AIDS fail to present a circumstance that warrants downward
departure).
19. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (Nov. 1992).
20. Id. § 5H1.5.
21. Id. § 5H1.6.
22. See Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101
YALE L.J. 1755 (1992) (citing Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681
(1992)). Judge Lay supports Professor Freed's criticism that "the guidelines have
become unnecessarily rigid[,] ... imprisonment policies [have become] unduly se-
vere[,J ... [and] courts of appeals have contributed to the rigidity of [the federal
sentencing] process by restricting the authority of judges to depart from the guide-
lines in appropriate circumstances." Id. at 1762 (footnote omitted).
23. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 JUDI-
CATuRE 173, 173 (1995) (Though "highly unpopular among judges, defense attor-
neys, and scholars .... [a]s of November 1994, 17 states had placed guidelines into
effect, and five more had appointed commissions to implement or study this
approach.").
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2. Federal Courts' Treatment of Condition of Confinement Issues
Harsh conditions of confinement have caused some sentencing
courts to account for a defendant's disabilities. A federal court may
depart from a sentence prescribed by the Guidelines when valid rea-
sons are submitted for the "departure."'24 The statutory basis for
individualized sentencing pre-dates the Sentencing Guidelines
themselves.2 The authority to "individualize" a sentence provides
the very discretion that the Sentencing Guidelines were designed to
limit.26
Several circuits have departed from the Guidelines after consider-
ing specific offender characteristics. Some courts have addressed
defendants' vulnerability in prison, as Justice Alexander did when
he sentenced Fawn Buzzell and Arthur Ellis. Rather than imposing
conditions on the prisons, these courts simply reduced the defend-
ants' sentences. In United States v. Lara,27 the sentencing court de-
parted downward from the Guidelines because the defendant's
"immature appearance, sexual orientation and fragility... made
him particularly vulnerable to in-prison victimization."2 Because
extreme vulnerability was not considered adequately by the Sen-
tencing Commission, the court held that departure from the Guide-
lines was warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).29 Similarly, the
24. See Tchao, supra note 13, at 356 n-53 ("[A] court must presumptively impose
a sentence within the Guideline range unless 'the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guide-
lines ....') (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (West Supp. 1991)); see also United
States v. Moe, 65 F.3d 245, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1995) (supporting determination of dis-
trict court judge that "there [were] grounds present for both upward and downward
departure") (quoting Tr. of Afternoon Sentencing. July 13, 1994. at 17).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988). The statute provides: "No limitation shall be placed
on the information concerning the background. character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1988), which provides: "The court shall impose a sentence of the kind. and within
the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission ...."
26. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H intro, comment (Nov. 1992) (stating that most of-
fender characteristics are "not ordinarily relevant" to a court's sentencing decision).
For an in-depth discussion of the conflicts, see Stacey M. Studnicki, Individualized
Sentencing: Federal Sentencing Departures Based Upon Physical Condition, 1994
DEr. C.L. REv. 1215, 1219-23 (1994). Studnicki discusses how federal courts have
dealt with conditions of confinement issues under the Federal Guidelines. Parts
H.A.1-2 of this Note are based primarily on Studnicki's comprehensive research and
analysis of federal sentencing departures.
27. 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990).
28. Id. at 603, 605.
29. Id. at 605. See also United States v. Tucker, 986 F.2d 278,280 (8th Cir. 1993)
(stating that "potential for victimization can provide a proper predicate for a depar-
ture") (citing United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d at 602-03).
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appellate court in United States v. Gonzalez3" upheld the district
court's downward departure from the Guidelines. The court stated
that the small size and feminine features of the defendant made him
"susceptible to homophobic attacks."'" Last, in United States v.
Long,32 the appellate court upheld the district court's downward de-
parture from the Guideline range of forty-six to fifty-seven months
to a sentence of five years probation. The district court based its
decision on the defendant's unspecified physical condition, which
rendered him "exceedingly vulnerable to possible victimization
",33
There are grounds other than vulnerability in prison where the
federal courts have departed from the Guidelines. In United States
v. McClean,31 the defendant had a severely impaired left leg that
required crutches. The Bureau of Prisons prohibited him from using
the metal crutches he had grown accustomed to for fear that other
prisoners would use them as weapons. 35 The sentencing court de-
parted downward from the Guideline range because this refusal
would cause the defendant to suffer more than the average inmate
and would make him vulnerable to other prisoners.3 6 Other factors
that may prompt or have prompted departure from the Guidelines
include: age,37 pregnancy, 38 deterioration of physical condition due
to incarceration,39 lack of ability by the prison system to accommo-
date a physical impairment,40 and inability to provide suitable treat-
30. 945 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1991).
31. id. at 526-27.
32. 977 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1992).
33. Id. at 1277.
34. 822 F. Supp. 961 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
35. Id. at 962.
36. Id.
37. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5H1.1 (Nov. 1993) (Guidelines limit consideration of age to where the defendant
"is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment (e.g., home confinement)
might be equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration.") (emphasis added).
38. See United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (down-
ward departure warranted to bedridden defendant, who risked losing permanent
custody of child if incarcerated longer than 12 months, "to protect the health of the
mother and child and to permit the mother to be united with her child ....").
39. See United States v. Mosesson, No. 89 Cr. 40, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13837,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (defendant's health was shown to be so fragile that incarcera-
tion might prove fatal); compare with United States v. Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d
618 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendant who was legally blind failed to persuade court that it
should depart downward because there was evidence that the prisons could accom-
modate blind prisoners); United States v. Jefferson, 786 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. W. Va.
1992) (defendant failed to show that his worsening medical condition was acute or
life-threatening).
40. See United States v. Boy, 1994 WL 59781 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1994) (court af-
firmed decision to depart downward from the Guidelines due to the patient's degen-
erative hip and knee, affliction with nonactive tuberculosis, and hyperactive
adjustment disorder); compare with United States v. Hilton, 946 F.2d 955 (1st Cir.
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ment.41 The trend, however, indicates that the amendment process
will continue to be used by the Sentencing Commission to further
restrict the discretion of the sentencing courts to depart from the
Guidelines.42 Indeed, a proposed 1994 amendment by the Sentenc-
ing Commission stated that "dissatisfaction with the available sen-
tencing range or a preference for a different sentence than that
authorized by the guidelines is not an appropriate basis for a sen-
tence outside the applicable guideline range."'43
Many states have not adopted systems similar to the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines." Instead, an alternative approach to sentencing
guidelines has been tried. This approach entails the state legislature
delegating to the judiciary the power to develop sentencing princi-
ples on a case-by-case basis. Maine has implemented such an
approach.
3. Maine's Choice: Judicial Common Law
a. Chief Justice Wathen's Proposal
Sentence review in Maine is barely thirty years old.45 Consistent
with the attention sentencing disparity has received nationally,
1991) (penal institution could accommodate defendant's chronic skin condition);
United States v. Kelly, No. 89-5200, 1990 WL 74315 (4th Cir. May 11, 1990) (court
held the prison could accommodate defendant's physical and mental injuries result-
ing from an automobile accident).
41. See United States v. Greenwood, 928 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1991) (defendant
amputee required treatment at the Veteran's Administration Hospital, which would
be unavailable if incarcerated); compare with United States v. DePew. 751 F. Supp.
1195, 1199 (E.D. Va. 1990) (court denied defendant's request for downward depar-
ture, stating "[d]efendant's AIDS infliction warrants sympathy. but not a
departure").
42. An example is the response by the Sentencing Commission to the departure
in United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990). In 1991 Studnicki noted that
the Sentencing Commission amended § 5H1.4 to provide that a defendant's -phy-
sique, [sic] is not ordinarily relevant . . ." in determining the sentence. Physique
essentially replaced the words "physical condition." See Studnicki. supra note 26. at
1237.
43. Studnicki, supra note 26, at 1218 (citing the proposed amendment to UNrrD
STATES SENTENCING COMrmSSIoN, GUIDELNES MANUAL § 512.0 comment (Nov.
1994)).
44. See Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 23, at 174 n.i. Sentencing
commissions in Connecticut, Maine, and Texas have recommended against guide-
lines. Sentencing commissions in Colorado, New York, South Carolina, and Wash-
ington, D.C. failed to convince their legislatures to pass sentencing guidelines.
45. In 1965, Maine adopted limited sentence review. P.L 1965, ch. 419, § 1 (ef-
fective Dec. 1, 1965) (codified at ME. Ruv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2141-2144 (West
1980)), repealed by P.L. 1989, ch. 218, §§ 1-4 (effective Sept. 30, 1989). The law
created the Appellate Division of the Supreme Judicial Court. It consisted of a
three justice panel that could change legally imposed sentences found to be im-
proper within the statutory range. Additionally, the panel possessed the direct
power to increase or decrease a sentence, and the decision was deemed final. Chief
Justice Wathen effectively described the impotence of the process:
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Maine's sentencing law has also been criticized. Under the belief
that sentencing disparity was a problem in Maine, Chief Justice
Wathen (then Associate Justice) called for an expansion of appellate
review in 1988. 6 Rather than advocating legislatively constructed
guidelines, Chief Justice Wathen urged the Legislature to allow the
Law Court to address the problem of sentencing disparity through
the development of common law sentencing principles.47 Chief Jus-
tice Wathen recognized that his urged expansion would create new
law.48 Much of Chief Justice Wathen's proposal became law in
1989.49
b. Maine's Current Sentencing Process
To understand the allowable limits of sentence review in Maine, it
is necessary to understand the process judges use to determine
sentences. This is an area of confusion for many lawyers and even
judges.50 Until two years ago the sentencing process had been only
partially defined."' The court in State v. Hewey5z articulated the
most complete explanation of the sentencing process to date. Jus-
tice Glassman, writing for a unanimous court, wrote that "we use
Because the division was perceived as a tribunal for correcting the most
egregious cases of sentence disparity, and not as a lawmaking body, its
work was hampered. In twenty-four years of operation, it changed only
twenty sentences and produced one useful opinion that included a worka-
ble set of criteria for distinguishing life sentences from sentences for a term
of years.
Daniel E. Wathen, Judges on Judging: Making Law the Old Fashion Way-One Case
at a Time, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 611, 611-12 (1991) [hereinafter Wathen, Judges on Judg-
ing]. The one case to which Chief Justice Wathen refers is State v. Anderson, Nos.
AD-78-37, AD-78-40 (Me. App. Div. June 30, 1980). For a detailed discussion of
that case, see Daniel E. Wathen, Disparity and the Need for Sentencing Guidelines in
Maine: A Proposal for Enhanced Appellate Review, 40 ME. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (1988)
[hereinafter Wathen, Disparity].
46. Wathen, Disparity, supra note 45.
47. Il at 5, 34-40.
48. "A review of criminal sentencing in Maine reveals the rather stark fact that,
with few exceptions, there is no law of sentencing." Id. at 34. See also Wathen,
Judges on Judging, supra note 45, at 612.
49. See Appellate Review Act, P.L. 1989, ch. 218, (effective Sept. 30, 1989) (codi-
fied at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2151-2157 (West Supp. 1995-1996)), amended
by P.L. 1991, ch. 525, § 4 (effective June 30, 1991) (codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 2151-2157 (West Supp. 1995-1996)) (the only significant change is that the
Supreme Judicial Court now has to remand any changes to the sentencing court
rather than order the changes itself). Id. §2156(1-A). See discussion infra part I.B
for a review of Supreme Judicial Court sentence review.
50. See State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154 (Me. 1993).
51. See State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105 (Me. 1991) (discussing two steps of the
three-step sentencing process); State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149, 150 (Me. 1991) (citing
State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1990)) (discussing only step one of the
three-step sentencing process.).
52. 622 A.2d 1151.
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this opportunity for clarification of our review of an appeal from a
sentence."' 3  The first step (Step I) of a sentencing court, which
actually involves two parts, is to determine the "basic" period of
incarceration.5' The court locates the sentence range statutorily
specified"5 for the crime of which the defendant has been convicted.
Once the sentence range is determined, the court then evaluates the
specific facts of the criminal conduct and gauges where on the statu-
tory continuum the defendant's conduct falls. Courts consider the
heinousness or seriousness of the crime and the basic sentences that
courts have imposed on other defendants guilty of similar criminal
conduct.
5 6
In order to "individualize" the sentence, the second step (Step H)
"consider[s] those factors peculiar to that offender."57 At this stage,
the sentencing judge adjusts the basic sentence to account for miti-
gating and aggravating factors.5 8 Justice Glassman defined the sec-
ond step as determining the "maximum" period of incarceration.5 9
Finally, the last step (Step III) involves deciding whether any por-
tion of the maximum sentence should be suspended.60 Hewey sup-
plies only one example of a factor that would warrant a suspension
in sentence. This occurs when a "court determines that society will
be better protected by affording a period of supervised proba-
tion."'6 1 Case law fails to provide any other factors that should be
considered in Step III, but it is apparent that this is the step where
the court may take into consideration everything else not pertaining
to the statute or the defendant. In other words, this is where a court
53. Id. at 1154.
54. Id. ("That determination is made solely by reference to the offender's crni-
nal conduct in committing the crime, that is, 'by considering the particular nature
and seriousness of the offense without regard to the circumstances of the of-
fender.' ") (quoting State v. Weir, 600 A.2d at 1106).
55. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1251-1258 (%Vest Supp. 1995-1996).
56. See State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149 (Me. 1991). Defendant pled guilty of arson
in violation of title 17-A, section 802 of the Maine Revised Statutes and the sentenc-
ing court imposed the maximum 20 year basic sentence, which was only -appropri-
ate for the most serious crimes not involving heinous and violent conduct against a
person." Id. at 151. On appeal of the sentence, the Law Court determined that a
basic sentence of that length should not be applied because there was nothing in the
record to suggest that the defendant's crime was of the most serious nature. The
record indicated that the defendant had set fire to an automobile but put no other
structure or person in danger. Therefore, the court decided that the principled basic
sentence should only be ten years. Id
57. State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1154 (citing State v. Weir, 600 A.2d at 1106).
58. Mitigating factors may include "the favorable prospect of rehabilitation [and]
... the offender's low probability of re-offense and, thus, [may] justify a diminution
of the basic period of incarceration .... ." Id. An aggravating factor may be the
"high probability of re-offense [(L.a, defendant's criminal record)], and, in order to
protect the public, [may] justify enhancing the basic period of incarceration." Id.
59. Id at 1155.
60. Id
61. Id
1996]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
can assess how the defendant's sentence will affect others.6' By the
completion of Step III, any adjustment of the maximum sentence
will become the defendant's final sentence.63
B. Sentence Review in the State of Maine
Four review processes are available to an inmate seeking to have
his sentence reviewed. The first and most direct route is a motion
pursuant to Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. A second option
involves a direct application to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
for sentence review. Third, an inmate can petition for post-convic-
tion review.65 The last option involves petitioning the Governor to
exercise his executive commutation power.6
62. Cf United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992). Although this case
involved federal sentencing guidelines, the sentencing court's rationale for signifi-
cantly reducing the defendant's sentence demonstrates the kind of decision impli.
cated in Step III of Maine's sentencing process.
The rationale for a downward departure here is not that [the defend-
ant's] family circumstances decrease her culpability, but that we are reluc-
tant to wreak extraordinary destruction on dependents who rely solely on
the defendant for their upbringing. [The sentencing judge] made it clear
that the departure was not on the behalf of the defendant herself, but on
behalf of her family.
Id at 129.
63. These three steps are very similar to the language of the legislation granting
the Supreme Judicial Court appellate review of sentencing. See ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 2155 (West Supp. 1995-1996), which states in relevant part:
Factors to consider by the Supreme Judicial Court
In reviewing a criminal sentence, the Supreme Judicial Court shall
consider:
1. Propriety of sentence. The propriety of the sentence, having regard to
the nature of the offense [Step I], the character of the offender [Step II],
the protection of the public interest [Step III], the effect of the offense on
the victim [Step III] and any other relevant sentencing factors recognized
under law ....
Id
64. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2151-2157 (West Supp. 1995-1996); ME.
R. CRIM. P. 40, 40A-40C.
65. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2121-2132 (West Supp. 1995-1996); ME.
R. CRIM. P. 65-78. See discussion infra part III.A.2, where post-conviction review is
discussed in more detail. Post-conviction review is not limited solely to sentence
review but is available to review any criminal judgment that meets certain criteria.
Though more comprehensive, its procedural requirements make it much less attrac-
tive to a defendant challenging his sentence than a motion pursuant to Rule 35. See
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2124, 2126 (West Supp. 1995-1996) (jurisdictional
prerequisites and exhaustion requirements); see also 1 DAVID P. CLUCHEY &
MICHAEL D. SErrzINGER, MAINE CRIMINAL PRACTICE, § 35.1 (Rev. Ed., Issue 0,
1992) (stating that a Rule 35 motion is the swiftest means of relief and does not
preclude relief under other available options, including one under post-conviction
review). Id at VI-53.
66. See ME. CONsT. art. V, pt. 1, § 11 which states: "[The Governor] shall have
power to remit after conviction all forfeitures and penalties, and to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons .... See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2161
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Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 permits an inmate to chal-
lenge the validity of his sentence. The rule affords a defendant three
forms of relief. Two forms of relief are found in Rule 35(a), 67 which
authorizes the sentencing court to correct either an illegal sentence
or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner.68 The third form of
relief, found in Rule 35(c), authorizes the sentencing court to reduce
a lawful sentence where the "original sentence was influenced by a
mistake of fact which existed at the time of sentencing." 69 Rules
35(a) and 35(c) provide procedures that are available after com-
mencement of execution but prior to a year of completed sen-
tence.7" Rule 35 is very attractive as it offers a swift remedy. Other
avenues of relief involve civil actions that may take years, perhaps
exceeding the length of the original sentence.7'
Upon timely filing of the motion, the original sentencing judge
will evaluate whether the complaint is appropriate for the motion
and, if so, whether it warrants a correction of sentence. It should be
(West Supp. 1995-1996) (requiring that the Attorney General, the District Attorney
for the county where the case was tried, and the public, through means of a general
circulation newspaper, have at least four weeks notice of such hearing).
67. ME. R. CRINt. P. 35(a) provides in relevant part: -Correction of Sentence.
On motion of the Defendant or the attorney for the state, or on the court's own
motion, made within one year after a sentence is imposed, the justice or judge who
imposed sentence may correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner."
68. See generally, CLUCHEY & SErTZImNER, supra note 65, § 35:
An illegal sentence is one which is not authorized by law. as where the
court imposes a sentence of imprisonment in excess of the maximum term
authorized by statute or less than the statutorily mandated minimum term.
A sentence imposed in an illegal manner is a "legal" sentence insofar as its
length or amount is authorized by law, but the procedure by which it has
been imposed does not comply with these rules or otherwise is unlawful.
Id. at VI-54 (footnote omitted).
69. ME. R. CRIM. P. 35(c) provides:
(c) Reduction of Sentence After Commencement of Execution.
(1) Tuning of Motion. On motion of the defendant or the attorney for
the state, or on the court's own motion, made within one year after the
sentence is imposed and before the execution of the sentence is completed,
the justice or judge who imposed the sentence may reduce that incom-
pleted sentence.
(2) Ground of Motion. The ground of the motion shall be that the origi-
nal sentence was influenced by a mistake of fact which existed at the time
of sentencing.
Id.
70. ME. R. CRIM. P. 35(a), 35(c)(1).
71. See State v. Bonney, 659 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1995). After serving almost two
years of his four-year sentence, the defendant moved for a reduction of his sentence
pursuant to ME. R. CrM. P. 35(c). Given the remaining length of his sentence, it is
obvious that seeking a remedy through a civil action, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, could
take as long as the remaining length of the defendant's sentence. See infra note 101
and accompanying text. Moreover, a successful civil action usually results in a
change of the prisoner's condition of confinement, not a reduction of his sentence
length.
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noted that a reduction in sentence pursuant to Rule 35(c) will occur
only for a gross abuse of discretion.7" If no "mistake" is found the
sentencing judge will dismiss the motion. A dismissal can be ap-
pealed to the Law Court7 3 and does not preclude the moving party
from pursuing other avenues that are available. This motion
"should be considered in conjunction with other avenues of relief
",74
In 1989, Chief Justice Wathen's proposal became law.75 This leg-
islation enabled the Law Court to review the propriety of a sentence
as well as the manner in which it was imposed. 6 Review by the
Supreme Judicial Court can be the next step for an inmate whose
motion for correction or reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35
was denied, or review can be pursued by a direct application. Maine
Rules of Criminal Procedure 40 and 40A-40C 77 govern the proce-
dure a defendant must follow.
A defendant given a sentence of one year or more can apply to
the Law Court for sentence review. 78 A panel comprised of three
Supreme Judicial Court justices screens the applications. If any one
of the three panelists votes in favor of granting leave, the entire Law
Court will hear the appeal and render a decision.79 If none of the
panelists votes in favor of granting leave, the appeal is denied and
will not be subject to further adjudication.80
C. The Subject Case: Factual and Procedural Background of
Department of Corrections v. Superior Court
The action initiated in Department of Corrections v. Superior
Court"' resulted from the 1991 sentencing of two convicted, border-
line mentally retarded, child sex offenders. 82 The sentencing court
recognized that incarceration in the Department of Corrections
posed a risk to the offenders due to the type of criminal conduct
each had engaged in and their below average intellectual and physi-
72. See CLUCHEY & SErrIZNGER, supra note 65, § 35.4 (citing State v. Frost, 582
A.2d 782 (Me. 1990); State v. Emery, 534 A.2d 1317, 1319 (Me. 1987); cf. State v.
Campbell, 540 A.2d 474, 475 (Me. 1988)).
73. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2151-2157 (West Supp. 1995-1996); ME.
R. CRIM. P. 40, 40A-40C.
74. See CLUCHEY & SErrzINGER, supra note 65, § 35.1.
75. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2155-2157.
76. Id. § 2155.
77. ME. R. CRIM. P. 40, 40A-40C (effective October 2, 1989).
78. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2151.
79. Ld. § 2152.
80. Id
81. 622 A.2d 1131 (Me. 1993).
82. The two defendants sentenced were Fawn Buzzell, a 56-year-old male con-
victed of one count of unlawful sexual contact with a seven-year-old boy, and Arthur
Ellis, a 33-year-old male who pleaded guilty to rape and unlawful sexual contact
with a 15-year-old girl. Id. at 1132.
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cal capacity. The court viewed both defendants as offenders who
"d[id] not have the intellectual capacity to look out for their own
best interest[s], who [were] easily taken advantage of. and most
likely [would] be subject to abuse and degradation without com-
plaint." 3 Although the court realized that issues surrounding con-
ditions of confinement typically arise in post-sentencing civil actions
or post-conviction review, the court reasoned that a different situa-
tion existed here, which warranted proactive intervention to prevent
a sentence amounting to cruel and unusual punishment.84 Conse-
quently, the court ordered the Department to complete a pre-sen-
tence investigation and develop an appropriate plan to "ensure the
decent, safe incarceration of such individuals."85 Otherwise, the
court reasoned, the court would have to incarcerate the defendants
in county jail-a poor solution as each offender would receive less
supervision. This would be in neither the inmates' nor society's best
interest.8 6
Unsatisfied with the Department of Corrections's pre-sentence in-
vestigation and plan, the court imposed "Special Conditions of Judg-
ment and Commitment"'  on the Department. In response, the
Department filed a motion to delete the sentence conditions on De-
cember 19, 1991. After a hearing on January 2, 1992, the court de-
nied the motion. The court reasoned that sentencing the defendants
to the Department without the protection of the conditions would
result in cruel and unusual punishment.ss Additionally, the court
83. Id. at 1133.
84. Specifically, cruel and unusual punishment would be in violation of U.S.
CONs. amend. VIII and ME. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
85. Department of Corrections v. Superior Court. 622 A.2d at 1133. Prior to the
sentencing hearings, the Superior Court entered the following order -[The) De-
partment of Corrections shall prepare a plan for commitment and protection of the
defendant if committed to the DOC. They shall adequately consider the defendant's
mental condition and situation as a potentially committed child sex offender." lrd at
1132 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1132 n.2. The conditions at issue were:
1. Defendant to receive expedited classification.
2. Defendant to be transferred to Bucks Harbor or some other medium
security facility after classifications.
3. While in the Department of Corrections facilities the Defendant to re-
ceive psychological and sex offender counseling.
4. A staff member shall have specific responsibility to monitor the defend-
ant's condition and circumstances while incarcerated, to recognize that the
defendant, because of his condition, may not take the initiative to speak or
act in his own behalf, and to attempt to assure that conditions which may
subject the defendant to abuse do not arise during the defendant's time at
the Department of Corrections.
5. The conditions and statements of the Department of Corrections re-
sponse of December 4, 1991, are incorporated by reference herein.
Id.
88. Id. at 1133.
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concluded "that it had the inherent authority to impose the condi-
tions in the discharge of its constitutional obligation to ensure that
the sentences d[id] not violate [the Constitution] as well as the im-
plicit authority flowing from 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151." s Later that
month, the Attorney General, on behalf of the Department, sought
relief from the Supreme Judicial Court in the form of a writ of man-
damus or prohibition pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure
81(c).9 ° The Attorney General argued that "the Superior Court had
exceeded its statutory authority by imposing the special conditions
... and that sentencing proceedings are not the proper forum for
dealing with constitutional concerns about conditions of confine-
ment." 91 The Law Court ordered that the special conditions be de-
leted because they exceeded the statutory authority of the Superior
Court. 92 The District Attorney and the Maine Civil Liberties
Union, which had been granted amicus curiae status, appealed.
They argued that the Superior Court "had the constitutional power
89. Id. The Law Court did not expand on the sentencing court's rationale regard-
ing title 17-A, section 1151 of the Maine Revised Statutes, which provides the pur-
poses of the "General Sentencing Provisions." It appears from context that the
sentencing court concluded it had implicit authority to impose the conditions in or-
der to achieve the purposes set out in § 1151(1), (3), and (5), which provide:
1. To prevent crime through the deterrent effect of sentences, the rehabili-
tation of convicted persons, and the restraint of convicted persons when
required in the interest of public safety;
3. To minimize correctional experiences which serve to promote further
criminality; [and]
5. To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate
criminological goals[.]
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151(1)(3)(5) (West 1983 & Supp. 1995-1996) (em-
phasis added).
90. Department of Corrections v. Superior Court, 622 A.2d at 1134; see infra note
5.
91. Department of Corrections v. Superior Court, 622 A.2d at 1134 (emphasis
added).
92. Id. The court's rationale, which was reiterated in the subsequent appeal, con-
sisted of the following:
The Supreme Judicial Court relying primarily on 17-A M.R.S.A § 1258
(Supp. 1992) (commissioner has "complete discretion" in determination of
initial place of confinement), 34-A M.R.S.A. § 1402 (1988) (commissioner
responsible for general supervision, management, and control of commit-
ted offenders in any correctional facility), and 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1201, 3061
(1988 & Supp. 1992), concluded that:
The sentencing justice is free to consider the likely disposition of the
prisoner if incarcerated and even to recommend certain conditions to
the Department. Under existing law, the sentencing justice has no au-
thority to invade the exclusive province of the Department by mandat-
ing that such conditions be met.
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and duty to address its concerns about the safety of the offenders if
sentenced to the Department., 9
3
On appeal, the Law Court recognized, of course, that "[t]he
courts of this state always have the power and duty to uphold the
State and Federal Constitutions"' when the constitutionality of a
statute is at issue.95 More precisely, the court stated: "[V]e think it
axiomatic that the courts in this state, if their power is invoked by
the appropriate process, have the power and duty to relieve prison-
ers from conditions of incarceration that amount to cruel or unusual
punishment .... 96 The court held that the Superior Court, due to
statutory limitations on its power, could make only recommenda-
tions to the Department because there was "no vehicle that invoked
a supervisory power over the Department of Corrections. ' 97
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Department of Corrections v. Superior Court Decision
This Note discusses how the Law Court handled the conditions of
confinement issue raised in Department of Corrections v. Superior
Court. The underlying issue is how a sentencing court may properly
address conditions of confinement when a defendant has special
mental and/or physical disabilities. The Law Court recognized that
the sentencing court, by imposing special conditions upon the De-
partment of Corrections, attempted to prevent potentially cruel and
unusual punishment. While proclaiming that in fact "the trial court
had before it no vehicle that invoked the supervisory power over the
Department of Corrections,"98 the court offered three possible "ve-
hicles" that would invoke the supervisory powerY9 The court
stated: "Such proceedings would include actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 2122-2132 (Supp.1992) (post-conviction
review). The trial court on motion or sua sponte can protect the
defendant by staying the execution of any criminal judgment en-
tered pending the conclusion of the collateral proceedings."' 10
1. An Action Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The number of suits brought by inmates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983101
has grown to awesome levels in the past fifteen years. Totaling al-
most 30,000, these suits constituted thirteen percent of the federal
93. Id. at 1132.
94. Id. at 1134.
95. Id
96. Id. at 1134-35.
97. Id. at 1135 (footnote omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1135 n.4.
100. Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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courts' total civil case filings in 1992.102 Many commentators feel
"that many of these suits harass state prison officials, drain time and
resources from the state attorney general offices, and consume an
unduly large percentage of federal magistrate and district court
judge time.' °3 In essence, prisoners' suits have a small constitu-
ency. Besides the sheer volume of suits, other problems make it
difficult for prisoners to bring cognizable complaints.
Prisoner suits under Section 1983 are almost invariably brought
pro se as there is no right to counsel.' °4 Not surprisingly, because
"most prisoners... [are] poorly educated, with only a rudimentary
acquaintance with the English language[,] ... prisoners who ha[ve]
no legal representation simply [can] not effectively present their
grievances.' 1 5 Even assuming a prisoner understands the judicial
system, inmate status presents obstacles to adequate discovery.1 0 6
Consequently, many complaints fail to pass initial procedural stages
and result in quick dismissals.10 7
102. Kim Mueller, Comment, Inmates' Civil Rights Cases and the Federal Courts:
Insights Derived from a Field Research Project in the Eastern District of California,
28 CgREIGHTON L. REv. 1255, 1259 (1995) (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD
ENDED SEPT. 30, 1992, 18, 27 (1992)).
103. See Donald P. Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State Prisoners
under Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IOWA L. REv. 935, 936 (1986).
104. Mueller, supra note 102, at 1280 nn.99 & 100 (noting that of 53 Eastern
District cases analyzed, 51 were pro se and of 33 requests for appointment of coun-
sel, 30 requests were denied).
105. William Wayne Justice, The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle, 43 STANFORD L. REv.
1, 2-3 (1990). Judge Justice has been recognized as having demonstrated "unusual
initiative" in prisoners' rights cases. Id. at 1. He has performed, from the bench,
cross-examinations for pro se inmates and has ordered the United States to appear
as amicus curiae to ensure the plaintiff equal discovery opportunity. See Ruiz v.
Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 679 F.2d
1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1982).
106. See Justice, supra note 105, at 3.
107. See iL at 2. For example, Judge Justice described a procedure followed by
his predecessor, the Honorable Joe W. Sheehy, which often resulted in dismissal of a
prisoner's complaint:
The plaintiff would be sworn, and Judge Sheehy would ask him to tell his
story. The prisoner would then give, to the best of his ability, a narrative
account of the incident or incidents that had led him to file his
complaint....
The defendant state official would then have an opportunity to cross-
examine the prisoner-plaintiff. Unlike the plaintiffs in these hearings, the
defendants were always represented by counsel [and] ... would have the
services of an assistant attorney general ....
Next, Judge Sheehy would ask the plaintiff if he had any evidence, other
than his own testimony, to present to the court. Plaintiffs may have had
such evidence from time to time, but I never saw any presented at the
hearings I attended. Defendants, on the other hand, usually would pro-
duce both witnesses and documentary evidence to bolster their accounts.
After the witnesses for the defense were examined, the plaintiff typically
would attempt some halting cross-examination. This was more likely to be
[Vol. 48:123
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
Additionally, prisoners' civil rights cases often take longer than
other civil actions. One study showed that the average duration for
a prisoner's case was 260 days, which was approximately 100 days
longer than other civil actions filed in the same time period." 5 Be-
cause of the duration of these actions, many prisoners (usually with
the assistance of legal counsel) try to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion, which is a remedy rarely granted."° For persons such as Fawn
Buzzell or Arthur Ellis, this "vehicle" provides no real means of
protection. This is a reactive process meant to correct past viola-
tions from reoccurring. To qualify for this vehicle, Fawn Buzzell
would have to be raped or beaten and then be able to articulate
what had happened to him, which would be an unlikely scenario
given his mental capacity.
2. The Impotence of Title 15, Sections 2121-2132 of the Maine
Revised Statutes Annotated
The second vehicle listed by the Law Court that may be used to
invoke supervisory power is post-conviction review.110 This is a pro-
cess initiated by the inmate, not by the sentencing court. A close
look at the statutory language makes it apparent that the Law Court
either carelessly included this alternative or did not intend this vehi-
cle to apply to the facts in Department of Corrections. Section 2122,
entitled "Purpose," provides that post-conviction review is designed
to remedy those restraints or impediments caused by an illegal crim-
inal judgment or post-sentencing proceeding."' Section 2125, which
provides the ground for relief, includes language that the criminal
"backchat" and denial, rather than recognizable cross-examination. At the
conclusion of the defendant's presentation. Judge Sheehy would ask the
plaintiff if he had any rebuttal evidence to present. Invariably, the plaintiff
would not. Judge Sheehy would then dismiss the complaint from the
bench.
Id.
108. Mueller, supra note 102, at 1282 (citation omitted).
109. Telephone Interview with James A. Dumont, Esq., Partner of Keiner, Du-
mont & McCaffrey, P.C., Middlebury, VT (Nov. 14, 1995).
110. ME- REv. STAT. ArN. tit. 15. §§ 2121-2132 (West Supp. 1995-1996). It
should be noted that post-conviction review replaces the remedies pursuant to post-
conviction habeas corpus and common law habeas corpus, including habeas corpus
as recognized in title 14, sections 5501, 5509, and 5546 of the Maine Revised Stat-
utes. Id. § 2122.
111. Id. Section 2122 provides the following:
This chapter shall provide a comprehensive and, except for direct appeals
from a criminal judgment, the exclusive method of review of those criminal
judgments and of post-sentencing proceedings occurring during the course
of sentences. It is a remedy for illegal restraint and other impediments speci-
fied in section 2124 which have occurred directly or indirectly as a result of
an illegal criminal judgment or post-sentencing proceeding.
Id. (emphasis added).
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judgment or sentence be unlawful or unlawfully imposed. 112 Conse-
quently, an analysis of post-conviction review fails to illuminate a
viable process that could invoke supervisory power for situations
similar to those found in Department of Corrections. Recall that in
Department of Corrections neither the two defendants nor the sen-
tencing court alleged that there had been an unlawful criminal judg-
ment or a judgment that was unlawfully imposed.
3. Trial Court, on Motion or Acting Sua Sponte, Holding a
Collateral Proceeding
The last vehicle provided by the Law Court grants the Superior
Court supervisory power to stay the execution of any criminal judg-
ment entered pending the conclusion of a collateral proceeding.'
This action is contingent upon a defendant's motion or the sentenc-
ing court acting sua sponte."4 No rule of criminal procedure or stat-
utory authority grants a superior court this right. Instead, the Law
Court, citing Cutler Associates, Inc. v. Merrill Trust Company,115
stated that the power to stay is inherent under the court's general
supervisory power over its own process." 6 It is not surprising that
Justice Alexander and the defense attorneys failed to use this vehi-
cle. First, it is unclear what "collateral proceeding" means here.
Second, defense counsel understandably would not have looked to
Cutler Associates because it is a civil case. Last, this case has not
been cited for this proposition in any other Maine case since it came
down in 1978. Arguably, the ability to stay the execution of judg-
ment was expanded in Department of Corrections to include crimi-
nal proceedings.
112. Section 2125 states: "A person who satisfies the prerequisites of section
2124 may show that the challenged criminal judgment or sentence is unlawful or un-
lawfully imposed, or that the impediment resulting from the challenged post-sen-
tencing procedure is unlawful .... " (emphasis added).
113. Department of Corrections v. Superior Court, 622 A.2d 1131, 1135 n.4 (Me.
1993).
114. Id.
115. 395 A.2d 453 (Me. 1978). Suit was brought by Cutler Associates, Inc. to
confirm an award decided by an arbitrator pursuant to a contract's arbitration provi-
sion. Appellant Merrill asserted that the Superior Court erred when it refused to
stay the proceedings or entry of judgment until the resolution of another dispute
concerning the same contract. The Law Court refused to conclude that the failure to
stay the proceedings was error. "A stay of proceedings... is not a matter of right
but a matter of grace. The grant or denial of the stay rests in the sound discretion of
the court. It will only be granted when the court is satisfied that justice will be
thereby promoted." Id. at 456 (citations omitted).
116. The Law Court stated: "It is within the inherent power of the Superior
Court, under its general supervisory power over its own process, to stay temporarily
a proceeding before it. It may temporarily stay the execution of its judgment when-
ever it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice." Id. (footnote omitted) (cita-
tions omitted).
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What collateral proceeding could have been initiated? The sen-
tencing court may have had a collateral proceeding in mind when it
ordered the Department of Corrections to conduct pre-sentence in-
vestigations. Perhaps justifiably, the Law Court did not qualify the
sentencing court's attempts to force the Department to develop a
plan as a collateral proceeding. This may be because the sentencing
court was instructing a department of the Executive Branch, which
was not a party to the case at hand, to perform extraordinary tasks.
Since it is uncertain what action Justice Alexander could have taken
to achieve the result sought, this final vehicle offered by the Law
Court remains unclear and untested. Perhaps there is no collateral
proceeding that would apply to the facts in Department of Correc-
tions and the Law Court merely was attempting to outline potential
vehicles.
The three vehicles offered by the Law Court pose significant
problems to prisoners. The only procedure that definitively enables
a court to address conditions of confinement is an action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Post-conviction review pursuant to title 15, sec-
tions 2121-2132 of the Maine Revised Statutes, is not practicable if
the defendant is not challenging the legality of the sentence or the
method by which it was imposed. Additionally, it remains unclear
under what conditions a collateral proceeding would support the use
of a power to stay on the facts of Department of Corrections.
B. State v. Bonney
The case of State v. Bonney1 7 provides valuable insight into how
a trial court applied Department of Corrections. On December 17,
1992, Derek Bonney accidentally ran John-Paul Parisien off the
road."' Mr. Parisien was killed instantly when his car struck a stand
of trees. Mr. Bonney soon was apprehended and results from tests
taken later that night at the police station indicated a blood-alcohol
level of .12 percent." 9 The defendant was indicted on January 4,
1993, for a number of offenses, including manslaughter.120 Under a
December 1993 plea agreement the defendant pled guilty to man-
slaughter and operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
In return, the State recommended a cap of four years unsuspended
sentence.' 2 '
117. 659 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1995).
118. 1d at 1269.
119. Appellee's Brief at 1, State v. Bonney (No. OXF-95-10).
120. The list of offenses included manslaughter, aggravated OUI, leaving the
scene of a personal injury accident, and driving to endanger. It
121. The defendant was incarcerated immediately after his sentencing hearing on
March 10, 1994. He was sentenced to the maximum term allowable under the plea
agreement: eight years, all but four suspended, plus six years probation. Record of
Sentencing Hearing of 3/10194 at 32, State v. Bonney (No. OXF-95-10) [hereinafter
Sent. Hearing].
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The defense mounted a persuasive argument based on expert tes-
timony that convinced the court it should take into consideration
the defendant's rare disease, reflex sympathetic dystrophy
(RSD). 1  The illness became the most troubling factor for the
court in its determination of a sentence."- Upon assurance from
the prosecution that the Department of Corrections could care ade-
quately for the defendant, the court felt as though its only alterna-
tive was to trust that the Department could and would provide
adequate care. 24
On June 17, 1994, Mr. Bonney filed a Rule 35(c)"2, motion pro
se,2 6 which alleged that the Department of Corrections could not
care adequately for him.'27 Since the record showed that the sen-
122. See Letter from Charles L. Robinson, Ph.D., Charles L. Robinson Clinical
and Forensic Psychology, to Albert J. Beliveau, Jr., Esq., Bonney's Counsel (Feb. 24,
1994) (on file with the University of Maine Law Review). In 1985, Bonney acciden-
tally shot a nailgun into his ankle, which resulted in the development of the rare
disease, reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD). Id. at 2. Mr. Bonney is in the third
stage of the disease, which does not have a cure. He suffers from spreading paraly-
sis, extreme pain, and irreversible muscle and bone damage. Id. He has undergone
nerveblock therapy five times, has had two experimental surgeries, and has a mor-
phine pump implanted in his body. Id. at 3-5.
Dr. Charles L. Robinson wrote that, because of the disease, several factors should
be considered in sentencing the defendant, such as frequent changes of clothes due
to excessive perspiration, night time exacerbation of symptoms, infection control, his
pattern of sleeplessness, high fevers, excruciating pain, the need for emergency room
services, and self-medication with high doses of morphine. Id. at 6-7.
123. See Sent. Hearing, supra note 121, at 30-31:
The greatest difficulty in this particular case in fashioning an appropriate
remedy is Mr. Bonney's medical condition. I wish I could take some ac-
tions to guarantee that his medical condition could be appropriately and
humanely addressed by a Department of Corrections sentence.
... But our Supreme Court had made it quite clear that it is not for the
trial judge to try to run the Department of Corrections facilities ... number
1, in accordance with the constitutional directive, that they are not to be
imposed to operate in a way that results in cruel and abusive treatment.
... We have to trust that they have the appropriate medical facilities.
124. Id.
125. See supra note 69.
126. Appellant's Brief at 2, State v. Bonney (No. OXF-95-10). Counsel was ap-
pointed by the court on July 1, 1994. Ita
127. See Motion to Correct or Reduce Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35 at 3-5, State
v. Bonney (No. CR-93-20) (arguing that deficiencies of care consist of the following:
changes in the times of medicating that aggravate his pain and often require a nurse
to aid in the middle of the night; variances in the amount of time it takes a nurse to
visit thereby leaving the defendant in acute pain; Department of Corrections' insis-
tence on giving defendant a type of morphine that he is not accustomed to, which
results in a lack of pain blocking; the location of the medical department lacks ramps
necessary for the defendant's access (two flights of stairs away); inter-floor moving
requires a guard and another inmate to actually lift the defendant in his wheelchair,
risking fall; the defendant is not allowed to go to the gym to exercise his arms, caus-
ing his muscles to degenerate; the defendant is not allowed to go to the recreation
room because there is no other way to get there besides stairs; the high risks to the
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tencing court assumed the Department's ability to care adequately
for Bonney,"' the defendant argued that this constituted a "mistake
of fact which existed at the time of sentencing."12 9 Bonney argued
that the criteria set out in Rule 35 had been satisfied and warranted
a reduction of his sentence.
The State denied that the Department of Corrections could not
care adequately for Bonney130 and argued that granting the motion
would result in the opening of a huge "Pandora's Box" of Rule 35
motions from inmates complaining of Department deficiencies.13 1
Justice Alexander, who had imposed the "Special Conditions" in
Department of Corrections, concluded that the dismissal of Bonney's
Rule 35(c) motion was necessary in light of the Law Court's holding
in Department of Corrections.32 Justice Alexander, perhaps over-
reacting, interpreted the decision in Department of Corrections to
say that the sentencing court lacks the authority to protect inmates,
even those with severe disabilities, at the sentencing stage.' 33 He
concluded that the decision precluded his court from "address[ing]
defendant in the event of a fire because of his need of assistance to descend stairs;
and defendant's limitations on using the commissary since that too involves the use
of stairs). Id.
128. See supra note 123.
129. Mn. R CEuM. P. 35(c)(2).
130. See State's Answer to Defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence at 1. State v.
Bonney (No. CR-93-20).
131. Record of Hearing on Bonney's Motion to Correct or Reduce Sentence Pur-
suant to Rule 35 of 12/29/94 at 6. 7-8, State v. Bonney (No. CR-93-20) [hereinafter
Rule 35 Hearing]. This argument is illogical. If a defendant moves to have his sen-
tence reduced under Rule 35(c), complaining of Department deficiencies of care, he
will have to show that the deficiency, or the presumption that the deficiency did not
exist, was a prevalent issue at the time of the sentencing, which influenced the sen-
tencing court's determination of sentence. See Mn. R. Criat. P. 35(c)(2).
132. Throughout the hearing on Bonney's Rule 35 motion. Justice Alexander re-
peatedly stated that given the holding of the court in Department of Corrections, he
doubted that Bonney's argument was appropriate for a Rule 35 motion. Justice Al-
exander stated: "I don't think in light of what the Law Court has said, the Depart-
ment of Corrections [v.] Superior Court, this is likely-this is the way it's
appropriate to go." Rule 35 Hearing, supra note 131, at 9-10. Obviously sympa-
thetic to Bonney, Justice Alexander contemplated the effectiveness of civil routes
noted in Department of Corrections (Le., action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). He also
recognized it likely would take too long. Id. at 5, 9. Justice Alexander stated that if
he were to grant the Rule 35 motion there would be a lot of effort spent having a
factual hearing and developing a workable record, whereby any ruling he issued
potentially could be overruled by the Law Court. Id. at 11, 13. He deduced that the
best route involved dismissing the motion immediately, so that when Bonney ap-
pealed, the Law Court would take the facts claimed as true for the purpose of a
hearing. Justice Alexander was confident that the Law Court would render a quick
decision if it believed that Bonney's argument was appropriate for a Rule 35 motion.
Id. However, because Justice Alexander did not believe the Law Court would de-
termine that the issue was appropriate for a Rule 35 motion, he urged Bonney to
supplement the appeal with a civil action. Id. at 11-13.
133. Id.
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conditions of incarceration issues on a Rule 35 motion."'" Bonney
appealed.
On appeal, both sides repeated their arguments presented in the
Rule 35 motion hearing. Bonney also cited Green v. State135 as au-
thority for the proposition that he had a right to be sentenced on
accurate information. 136 The State argued that the decision of De-
partment of Corrections v. Superior Court precluded the sentencing
court from considering a mistake of fact argument (i.e. comfort and
safety of convicts). 1 37 Not in complete agreement with either party,
the Law Court affirmed the dismissal. 38
1. The Law Court Narrows the Possibilities by Which a Court
May Address Conditions of Confinement by Disallowing
a Correction or Reduction of Sentence
Pursuant to Rule 35(c)
In Bonney, the court was presented with a clear-cut case. It was
evident from the record that the sentencing court was concerned
with the Department of Corrections's ability to care adequately for
Bonney. 39 Justice Alexander wanted to ensure protection but felt
he must assume the Department could offer Bonney adequate care.
This suggests that Justice Alexander would have accounted for defi-
ciencies in care by adjusting Bonney's original sentence. Despite
the apparent appropriateness of the facts for a Rule 35(c) motion,
the ambiguous meaning of a "mistake as to a material fact"' 4 pro-
vided the Law Court with the opportunity to prevent a sentencing
court from addressing conditions of confinement on such a motion.
The Law Court denied review under Rule 35(c), citing State v.
Hunter.'4 1 Hunter involved a statute that allowed the sentencing
court to reduce an inmate's sentence based on an evaluation of the
134. State v. Bonney, 659 A.2d 1269, 1270 (Me. 1995).
135. 247 A.2d 117 (Me. 1968).
136. State v. Bonney, 659 A.2d at 1270.
137. Id.
138. Id. The Law Court held that in spite of a record that demonstrates that the
sentencing court may have relied on the Department of Corrections's ability to care
adequately for Bonney (the court refers to this reliance as a prediction), this "pre-
diction [could not] represent a fact which existed at the time of sentencing." Id.
139. See supra note 123.
140. The Law Court has provided only one example of an appropriate issue to
raise on a Rule 35(c) motion. It was a hypothetical given in State v. Frost, 582 A.2d
782 (Me. 1990), which allows a correction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35(c) if a
defendant was sentenced upon an inaccurate criminal record and if this misinforma-
tion influenced the sentencing court. Id. at 783. The court cited MAINE CRIMINAL
PRACrtCE, § 35.4 (1992) as authority. Ironically, MAINE CRIMINAL PRACncE cites
Frost for the same proposition. CLucH-Y & SErrZINGER, supra note 65, at VI.60
n.47.
141. State v. Bonney, 659 A.2d at 1270 (citing State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797 (Me.
1982)).
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inmate's post-conviction behavior.'42 Under the statute, a prisoner
could earn a chance to have his sentence reduced by being an exem-
plary inmate. In invalidating the statute, the Law Court held that
the separation of powers mandated by the Maine Constitution re-
quires that any power specifically granted to one branch cannot be
exercised by another unless expressly permitted by Maine's Consti-
tution.143 The court equated the power of a court to reduce an in-
mate's sentence based on his good behavior with the Governor's
power to commute a sentence.' In Bonney, the court held that
"[f]or his part, Bonney fails to consider the constitutional limitations
on a court's power to reduce a sentence previously imposed." 4 '
This reference was inaccurate, however, because Bonney's motion
was based on a mistake of fact rather than on his exemplary behav-
ior in prison.
The Law Court's decision should have been foreseen. Bonney's
illness presented a Step II issue, arguably a mitigating factor. The
court consistently has been reluctant to review Step II issues.146
Bonney's illness was no exception. As a result, the decision in Bon-
ney narrowed the interpretation of Rule 35(c) and reduced the over-
all opportunities of a court to address conditions of confinement.
Consequently, we know of only one potential "mistake of fact" that
will warrant review under Rule 35(c)-"a mistake about the nature
or extent of a defendant's criminal record." 47
2. The Law Court Uses Bonney as a Tool to Reaffirm Its Position
Stated in Department of Corrections Concerning
Conditions of Confinement
The Law Court did not concur with the State's proposition that
Department of Corrections precluded the sentencing court from
"consider[ing] the comfort, convenience, and safety of convicted
persons .... "4 The court quoted directly from Department of Cor-
rections: "'We do not undermine the authority of the trial court to
conduct a sentencing hearing and to inquire into the options avail-
able to aid the court's sentencing discretion.' "1,49 The court further
wrote that "[w]e also stated.. . 'that the courts in this state, if their
power is invoked by the appropriate process, have the power and
142. The statute at issue was ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A. § 1255 (West 1983)
(repealed 1983).
143. State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d at 799-800 (construing M. CONST. art. II, §§ 1,
2).
144. Id. at 802.
145. State v. Bonney, 659 A.2d at 1270.
146. See discussion infra part I1I.C.
147. CLUcHEY & SErrzINGER, supra note 65, § 35.4; see also supra note 140.
148. State v. Bonney, 659 A.2d at 1270.
149. Id. (quoting Department of Corrections v. Superior Court, 622 A.2d 1131,
1135 (Me. 1993)).
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duty to relieve prisoners from conditions of incarceration that
amount to cruel and unusual punishment .. . ."150 Based on that
language, Justice Alexander may have misinterpreted Department of
Corrections when he concluded that sentencing proceedings are not
the proper forum for dealing with conditions of confinement. 51 Ar-
guably, a reasonable reading of the opinion allows one to infer that
a sentencing court can address conditions of confinement and stay
proceedings but may not impose conditions upon the Department
until an appropriate vehicle is invoked.
In Bonney, the Law Court reiterated its discussion in Department
of Corrections concerning appropriate vehicles. 152 However, none
of the vehicles offer effective protection to inmates. One may infer
that the Law Court is reluctant to allow challenges to sentence de-
terminations, especially by the sentencing court, after a sentence has
been imposed. This leaves open the question of how a sentencing
court can address issues of confinement in its determination of a
sentence.
C. The Law Court's Reluctance to Change the Sentencing Court's
Determination of the Maximum and Final Sentence
"The discretion of the sentencing justice is virtually unrestrained
when it is exercised within the statutory range of sentences."' 153 Un-
fortunately, the inequities resulting from the unlimited discretion of
sentencing judges continue despite Maine Supreme Judicial Court
sentence review. Very little has changed to provide a "more effec-
tive and pervasive means of structuring sentencing discretion. 154
The current posture of the Law Court is highly deferential toward
the sentencing court's analyses of Steps II and III.' With that in
150. Id.
151. The conclusion that sentencing proceedings are not the proper forum for
dealing with conditions of confinement was asserted by the Department of Correc-
tions in argument but was never affirmed by the Law Court. See Department of
Corrections v. Superior Court, 622 A.2d at 1134.
152. See supra part III.A.
153. Wathen, Disparity, supra note 45, at 34.
154. Id.
155. For Step II issues, see State v. Tapley, 609 A.2d 722, 723 (Me. 1992) (citing
State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991)) (court affirmed defendant's sentence
and held that the sentencing court, which has wide discretion in assessing aggravat-
ing factors, did not abuse its discretion); State v. Collind, 602 A.2d 1147, 1147 (Me.
1992) (court reviewed a dismissed Rule 35(c) motion and affirmed sentence of an
HIV-positive defendant who contended there existed a mistake of fact because the
sentencing court assumed he had a full life expectancy); State v. Lemieux, 600 A.2d
1099, 1101 (Me. 1991) (court found no error in sentencing court's evaluation of miti-
gating factors); State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991) (citing State v. Rosa,
575 A.2d 727 (Me. 1990)) (court held that sentencing court has wide discretion in
determining aggravating and mitigating factors and affirmed sentencing court's indi-
vidualization of defendant's sentence); State v. Clark, 591 A.2d 462, 464 (Me. 1991)
(court affirmed the sentencing court's determination of weight given to the defend-
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mind, it is useful to revisit the major goal sought by appellate re-
view-to reduce sentencing disparity. How well has the new system
performed? 5 6  All Law Court sentence modifications, except
one,157 stem specifically from Step I errors of principle." It is ap-
ant's potential for rehabilitation); State v. Constantine, 588 A.2d 294,296 (Me. 1991)
(court affirmed defendant's sentence on appeal where the defendant argued the sen-
tencing court put too much emphasis on general deterrence and failed to take into
account adequately his remorse and potential for rehabilitation); State v. Frost, 582
A.2d 782,782 (Me. 1990) (court affirmed dismissal of defendant's Rule 35(c) motion
that contended a mistake of fact existed because the prosecutor asserted that the
defendant had seven burglary convictions rather than the correct number of four);
State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145, 151 (Me. 1990) (court held that the -sentencing
justice did not err in determining that the circumstances of the defendant did not
require any mitigation in the sentence"); State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778. 781-82
(Me. 1990) (unpersuaded by defendant's argument that his sentences were excessive
in length and failed to provide an incentive for rehabilitation, the court affirmed
defendant's sentence); State v. Emery. 534 A.2d 1317. 1319 (Me. 1987) (court af-
firmed dismissal of defendant's Rule 35(c) motion contending that there existed no
mistake of fact in the court's evaluation of defendant's prospects for rehabilitation).
For Step III issues see State v. Fleming, 644 A.2d 1034. 1036 (Me. 1994) (citing
State v. Howard, 541 A.2d 1295 (Me. 1988)) (court gave deference to sentencing
court's determination to factor in the victim's statements describing the impact of
the defendant's crime); State v. Kehling, 601 A.2d 620. 625 (Me. 1991) (court af-
firmed sentence, referring to the need to protect the public and the sentencing
court's discretion in relation to this factor (although the court treats "protecting the
public" as an aggravating factor, this decision was handed down before State v.
Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Me. 1993), which articulated "protecting the public" as
being included in Step I)).
156. As pointed out by Chief Justice Wathen in Sentencing and Statistics, 6 ML.
BAR J. 290 (1991), "[t]here is no official or unofficial compilation of sentences im-
posed in felony cases and ... the judicial system neither collects nor analyzes sen-
tence data." Id. at 290. Until data is collected, it will be very difficult, if not
impossible, to gauge the effectiveness of the new sentencing review process.
157. See State v. Gonzales, 604 A.2d 904, 907 (Me. 1992) (court remanded de-
fendant's sentence for resentencing because the sentence was constitutionally imper-
missible in that the defendant, a Dominican with no prior criminal record, was
arrested for selling just over one half of an ounce of cocaine and sentenced to 15
years rather than a lesser sentence in part because the prosecution argued that -the
Dominicans dominate the drug trade in Lewiston").
It should be noted, however, that Chief Justice Wathen has expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the enormous discretion given to the sentencing court regarding Step II
determinations. See State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Me. 1991) (Wathen, J.,
dissenting) (questioning the validity of the sentence imposed on the defendant in
light of Step H factors). See also State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 805-06 (Me. 1982)
(Wathen, J., dissenting) (arguing that progress towards a noncriminal way of life
should remain an appropriate basis for sentence reduction).
158. See State v. Bolduc, 638 A.2d 725, 727-28 (Me. 1994) (court held that de-
fendant's criminal conduct alone could not warrant the maximum statutory sen-
tence, which had been imposed by the lower court as her basic sentence); State v.
Reynoso, 604 A.2d 441,442-43 (Me. 1992) (court remanded the defendant's 20-year
sentence for reevaluation using the principles articulated in State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d
149, 151 (Me. 1991), and State v. Clark, 591 A.2d 462,464 (Me. 1991), which allowed
the imposition of the maximum basic sentence only when the crime is of the most
serious nature, which the court determined was not the case here); State v. Gosselin,
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parent that courts still retain a significant amount of discretion in
determining sentences, which results in a formidable barrier for
many defendants at the appellate review stage.15 9 In other words, if
a judge imposes the correct "basic" sentence, he will have free reign
to determine the maximum (Step II) and final sentences (Step III).
This assumes, of course, that the determination remains within per-
missible constitutional and statutory parameters. Chief Justice
Wathen's intent in proposing Supreme Judicial Court sentence re-
view was to reduce sentencing disparity. It is difficult to see how
this goal can be achieved if the Law Court refuses to inquire into the
validity of the sentencing court's determination of the maximum and
final sentence.
D. Where a Trial Court May Potentially Factor in a Defendant's
Disabilities
Sentencing courts retain as much discretion as they had prior to
the implementation of Chief Justice Wathen's proposal. As long as
a court determines Step I correctly, very few, if any, procedures can
be initiated to challenge successfully a sentencing court's determina-
tion. Therefore, almost anything courts consider important can be
factored into Step II or Step III of the sentencing process. For ex-
ample, Justice Alexander could have accounted for Mr. Bonney's
illness by rationalizing that a shorter length of incarceration, say two
600 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Me. 1991) (court vacated and remanded for resentencing de-
fendant's 40-year sentence, the maximum for manslaughter, which was determined
excessive given the facts of the case and that the trial judge acquitted the defendant
of murder, which has a 25-year minimum); State v. Clark, 591 A.2d 462, 464 (Me.
1991) (court sua sponte examined the defendant's 30-year sentence and determined
that it was in excess of the sentences given for similar criminal conduct, because the
rape he committed did not involve a "heightened degree of violence, injury, torture,
or depravity"); State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149, 151 (Me. 1991) (court decreased de-
fendant's basic sentence because the defendant's "crime [did] not present the sort of
circumstances that the expanded limit for Class A crimes was intended to address");
State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d 538, 542 (Me. 1991) (court reduced defendant's maxi-
mum sentences because "gross sexual misconduct could be committed in much more
aggravating and heinous ways"); State v. St. Pierre, 584 A.2d 618, 622 (Me. 1990)
(since defendant's criminal conduct (murder) was not aggravated by extreme cru-
elty, the court reduced his sentence from the maximum sentence of life imprison-
ment to 45 years); State v. Tellier, 580 A.2d 1333, 1334-36 (Me. 1990) (court ruled
that statute prohibits consecutive sentences when offenses arise from one criminal
episode).
159. The Law Court has stated specifically that it gives sentencing courts broad
discretion in determining sentences. See State v. Fleming, 644 A.2d 1034, 1036 (Me.
1994); State v. Cooper, 617 A.2d 1011, 1016 (Me. 1992); State v. Lemieux, 600 A.2d
1099, 1102 (Me. 1991); State v. Smith, 600 A.2d 1103, 1104 (Me. 1991); State v. Weir,
600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991); State v. Rosa, 575 A.2d 727, 730 (Me. 1990); State v.
Mudie, 508 A.2d 119, 121 (Me. 1986); State v. Cote, 507 A.2d 584, 585 (Me. 1986);
State v. Dumont, 507 A.2d 164, 167 (Me. 1986); State v. Farnham, 479 A.2d 887, 890
(Me. 1984); State v. Samson, 388 A.2d 60, 67 (Me. 1978); Green v. State, 247 A.2d
117, 120 (Me. 1968).
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years rather than four, would achieve the necessary deterrence and
retribution goals, because Bonney would suffer more day-to-day
than the average inmate.
This fundamental understanding, however, provides no panacea
and does not address the problem in Department of Corrections.
Justice Alexander was concerned for the safety of the defendants he
was sentencing to the Department of Corrections. Even if Justice
Alexander had given the defendants only half of the sentence he
imposed, it is likely that they still would be abused in prison. Justice
Alexander could not elect to impose a suspended sentence because
he had at least two competing interests: protection of the public and
protection of the victims. It is likely that Justice Alexander knew
the extent of his discretion but realized he could not balance these
competing interests. As a creative alternative, he imposed condi-
tions on the Department. The last sentence in the Law Court's
opinion in Department of Corrections underscores Justice Alexan-
der's dilemma: "The [sentencing] court's choices... are limited to
the statutorily prescribed dispositions, no matter how unsatisfactory
those options may be."'"
E. Recommendations for Maine's Sentencing Law
The Law Court has provided factors that qualify as mitigating or
aggravating circumstances 161 but not a comprehensive list. It would
be helpful for judges and practitioners to know with more certainty
what all the relevant factors are. Such a list would clarify for sen-
tencing judges what can be considered in Step II of the process as
well as provide prosecutors and defense attorneys with a solid basis
for developing arguments at sentencing hearings. This clarification
could be done in a Law Court opinion or through legislation.
There is also a need to make fundamental procedural changes in
the Law Court's sentence review process. This type of review can be
an efficient way to get a sentence modified, but there are numerous
shortcomings. The first problem lies in the application stage. If the
sentence was imposed by the superior court, the application must
conform to Form 12 of the Appendix of the Superior Court Forms.
If the sentence was imposed by the district court, it must conform to
Form 14 of the Appendix of the District Court Forms.'6 Neither
form allocates space for the petitioner to develop his argument."a
160. Department of Corrections v. Superior Court, 622 A.2d 1131, 1135 (Me.
1993).
161. See eg., State v. Hewey, 622 A2d 1151, 1154 (Me. 1993); State v. Weir, 600
A.2d 1105 (Me. 1991); Wathen, Disparity, supra note 45, at 17-18 (citing State v.
Anderson, Nos. AD-78-37. AD-78-40 (Me. App. Div. June 30, 1980).
162. ME. R. CRiM. P. 40(b).
163. Superior Court Form 12 and District Court Form 14 include the following:
request for sentence appeal, the date the sentence was imposed, the proceeding dur-
ing which the sentence was imposed, whether an appeal is pending pursuant to ME.
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Consequently, the panel that grants or denies leave for review by
the Law Court must do so before it hears the argument on which the
appeal is based. Indeed, the panel views only the application, a copy
of the docket entries, the charging instrument, the judgment and
commitment, a copy of the pre-sentence report (if any), and copies
of other exhibits and information used by the sentencing court."6
The second problem is that the panel submits no written decision
of its denials. This means not only that the panel is uninformed as
to the petitioner's argument on appeal but also that the prisoner's
lawyer has no idea why the application was denied leave. 65 Where
leave is granted, the full Law Court issues an opinion. However,
since so few appeals are granted, very little sentencing law is made.
For example, the panel granted leave to only nine appeals during
1994 and 1995. The development of Maine's sentencing law is ad-
vancing at a sluggish pace.
The Law Court uses the decisions of the Appellate Division,'6
which were issued before September of 1989, as a basis for some of
its decisions in the current review process. 67 This is entirely appro-
priate but gives rise to another problem. The Appellate Division's
decisions were reported in slip opinion form but never were pub-
lished in the Maine Reporter or the Atlantic Regional Reporter.
Consequently, the little sentencing law available is often next to im-
possible to locate.'"
There are solutions to these problems. First, space should be al-
lotted on Forms 12 and 14 to afford an applicant the opportunity to
develop an argument when he petitions the panel of the Supreme
Judicial Court-before the panel rules. Second, a written ruling
R. CRIM. P. 37 (Rule 36 for Form 14), and the address of the applicant. See also
Wathen, Judges on Judging, supra note 45, at 612 (discussing the procedural steps in
Supreme Judicial Court sentence review).
164. ME. R. CrM. P. 40(d).
165. See Wathen, Judges on Judging, supra note 45, at 613. Chief Justice Wathen
points out that the new sentence appeal system received 150 applications in its first
year of operation (1990), 92 of which were reviewed by the panel. Of the 92 re-
viewed, only 12 were granted leave to appeal by the panel. Neither the applications
granted leave nor the applications denied leave have statements of reason provided
by the screening panel. Thus, the vast majority of applicants are left wondering why
their application was denied. kd
166. See supra note 45.
167. See Wathen, Disparity, supra note 45, at 17-18. Chief Justice Wathen dis-
cusses State v. Anderson, Nos. AD-78-37, AD-78-40 (Me. App. Div. June 30, 1980),
and the opinion's importance in providing a workable guideline for sentencing
judges when determining a sentence for defendants convicted of murder.
168. See Wathen, Disparity, supra note 45, at 19. The problems cited by Wathen
under the old system persist in the new. Wathen explicitly cited three problems that
continue to beleaguer the current sentence review process: First, too few cases are
decided to develop this area of law; second, the system does not allow for informa-
tion to be disseminated; and third, the operation of the Appellate Division, with its
high turn-over rate, was not conducive as a law-making body. Id.
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should be documented and made available to the petitioner and the
public. This could prevent certain issues from reoccurring if it is
clear to practitioners that the argument they seek to present already
has been rejected. Last, an effort should be made to gather the Ap-
pellate Division slip opinions. They should be copied, organized in
a manageable format, and distributed so that they are available to
the public.
There also exists a desperate need to tabulate the length of
sentences that are imposed for the various types of criminal con-
duct.169 Currently, no such compilation exists. If no statistical evi-
dence is compiled, it is not possible to know if there was sentencing
disparity, whether there is now, or whether the reform accomplished
its goals.
Additionally, sentencing courts should be required to submit writ-
ten explanations of the process used to determine sentences in each
case. Too often the sentencing record fails to reflect clearly the sen-
tencing court's analysis, making it needlessly difficult for the appel-
late court to review for errors in principle. Further. these
explanations of the court's sentence determination should follow the
steps provided in State v. Hewey,17° thereby providing the Law
Court with a standard template for its own analysis.
If the current system has not reduced sentencing disparity and the
achievement of this goal remains a priority, Maine should imple-
ment sentencing guidelines through legislation. An adaptation of
the policy underlying the Federal Guidelines would enable a judge
to depart from the guidelines when it is appropriate. When a depar-
ture is deemed necessary, the court should state its reasoning, so
that an appellate court may determine whether the departure from
the guidelines is justified. 7 '
Finally, recalling Department of Corrections, it is obvious that
there is a need for an explanation by the Law Court of how to apply
the "vehicles" it offered in that case to the facts of that case, or
similar facts. How could Justice Alexander or the defendants have
applied these vehicles to afford protection? Admittedly, this re-
quires empathy for individuals who have committed egregious
crimes, but the alternative is abuse in prison and, more likely than
not, recidivism.
IV. CONCLUSION
Department of Corrections raised questions concerning whether a
defendant's disabilities could be taken into account when determin-
169. See Wathen, Judges on Judging, supra note 45, at 621-22.
170. See supra part II.A.3.b.
171. See United States v. Amaya-Benitez, 69 F.3d 1243 (2nd Cir. 1995) (sentence
departing from the Federal Guidelines was vacated and remanded for resentencing
because the sentencing court failed to state reasons for its departure).
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ing his sentence. The Law Court spoke forcefully, holding that ab-
sent a vehicle invoking supervisory power a sentencing court was
not to account for disabilities by imposing conditions upon the De-
partment of Corrections. The Law Court offered three vehicles that
would invoke supervisory power. It is apparent that these vehicles
are only appropriate for a limited number of situations, none of
which would have helped the defendants Justice Alexander was try-
ing to protect in Department of Corrections. The Law Court's deci-
sion precludes a trial court from taking actions that expose the
realities of prison. The Law Court effectively placed the complete
responsibility of raising conditions of confinement issues on in-
mates-a class of people who often lack the resources to mount a
viable legal challenge. As long as there is no mechanism that ad-
dresses the evils of prison, there will be no expensive problems to
rectify.
Aaron T Morel
